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CENTER STAGE: PERFORMERS AND

THEIR MORAL RIGHTS IN THE WPPT
t

Mira T. Sundara Rajan

I would like to begin by offering a word of thanks to the organizers
for this opportunity to discuss the WIPO treaties today, ten years after
their creation. And, of course, it is a special privilege for me to be on
a panel that is led by Professor Vaver, my copyright professor and
later, the generous supervisor of my doctoral work in copyright at
Oxford.
My talk will discuss the themes of this panel in a slightly different
context: I will consider the moral rights of performers as included in
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.' To introduce this
subject, I would like to return to first principles for a moment, and say
a few words about the general goals of the WIPO Internet Treaties.2
The avowed purpose of the documents that we are discussing
today is to adapt copyright law to the digital environment. In practice,
what does this mean? Two factors should be taken into consideration.
First, we are talking about a situation where, of course, there is
considerable scope for new methods of reproducing and
disseminating works through the growth of digital technology.
Secondly, it is important to notice the unprecedented scale on which
these activities are now occurring, thanks to the potential of
technology.
Although I make this statement with great care, I believe there is a
level of consensus that the reproduction and communication of
knowledge in a digital environment should, at least to some extent, be

t Canada Research Chair in Intellectual Property Law at the Faculty of Law, University
of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. B.A. Hons., McGill/Paris; LL.B., Osgoode; LL.M.,
University of British Columbia; D.Phil University of Oxford. The author gratefully
acknowledges the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
(SSHRC), which helped to support her participation in this event. My thanks also to Tom
Horacek (LLB Class of 2008, UBC), for his gracious and painstaking research assistance in the
final preparation of this article.
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs-wo034.html [hereinafter WPPT].
2 Id.; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm [hereinafter WCT].
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brought within the scope of copyright control.3 Our key policy
questions then become the following.
First, which activities need to be controlled by copyright law? In
this area, we find ourselves confronting a number of purely technical
questions about the operation of digital technology that may be
complicated to resolve from a copyright perspective. For example, do
both downloading and uploading need to be controlled by copyright? 4
Is caching something that should be restricted? This particular issue
has proven to be surprisingly controversial, and making caches for the
purposes of Internet transmission is an issue that has been considered
widely by courts in France and Canada, as well as the United States.5
Canadian courts have debated the interesting problem of whether
caching constitutes a "reproduction" of a work within the meaning of
copyright, or if it is in fact "necessary" for the effective functioning of
Internet technology.6
The second logical question then becomes, how much control do
we want? In other words, do we want to control all uses of a work, or
only some uses? This question raises the fundamental problem of
what constitutes fair use of a work, or fair dealing in the terminology
of Canada or the United Kingdom. It can also be expressed as a need
to find an appropriate balance, in copyright terms, between
right-holders and users of a work.7
It is interesting to consider the approach of the WIPO Internet
Treaties to this fundamental problem. In policy terms, the Treaties
represent a fairly straightforward attempt to extend copyright
restrictions globally over digital uses of works. The legal means of
doing so, as adopted by the drafters of the Treaties, are interesting in
3 I make this statement with a respectful nod towards those who have more extreme
views about copyright. A consideration of their position is, however, beyond the scope of this
brief discussion.
4 The issue has been debated in Canada, where the most recently proposed amendments
to the Copyright Act, Bill C-60, suggest that uploading would become illegal while
downloading would not be addressed. Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, House of
Commons of Canada, 1st Session, 38th Parliament, 53-54 Elizabeth I, 2004-2005, available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/l/parlbus/chambus/housebills/governimentC-60/C60_1/C603E.html, §§ 8 [new § 15 (1.1) (e)] and 10 [new § 18 (1.1) (b)].
5 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U. S. 913 (2005);
Ligue contre le racisme et l'antisemitisme et Union des etudiants juifs de France v. Yahoo! Inc.
et
Societe
Yahoo!
France,
T.G.I.
Paris,
May 22,
2000,
available at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm.; Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre
Le Racisme Et LAntisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004).
6 See, e.g., Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian
Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at
113-19, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 240 D.L.R.
(4th) [hereinafter SOCAN].
7 The theme of Professor Dinwoodie's remarks. Graeme Dinwoodie, A Comment on
ProfessorVaver, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 751 (2007).
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their own right. The Treaties seek to define digital uses of works as
copyright-protected uses, and then to place these uses outside the
scope of fair use or fair dealing exceptions to copyright. Key
copyright concepts, such as authorization of use (or infringement),
and communication of the work to the public, are redefined in this
context.
This approach leads to powerful results. For example, by simply
providing the means of communicating a work to the public, we may
be deemed to authorize the infringement of copyright in the work, as
in the Grokster case. 8 Similarly, enabling Internet downloading for
private use, traditionally allowed within fair use exceptions to
copyright, may now amount to an infringement of copyright law, also
suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Grokster. Among
other things, the reasoning in Grokster seems to support the
controversial view that the sheer volume of private use may be
sufficient to transform it into a public use within the terms of
copyright law. 9
Apart from these conceptual techniques, we also have practical
means that come into play when bringing activities within the scope
of copyright restrictions. Most powerful among these is the idea of
reformulating the enforcement of copyright to address digital issues.
The WIPO Internet Treaties contain legal provisions in support of
8 Grokster, 545 U.S. 913. The Supreme Court re-examined the so-called "safe harbor"
principle from the 1984 Sony decision, which would exempt technology from liability if it lends
itself to "substantial non-infringing uses." In Grokster, the Justices were divided in their
opinion, with one group arguing that the defendants failed because of insufficient evidence of
non-infringing use, while the other said that the proportion of current lawful use in this case
approximated the facts of Sony. The safe harbor principle itself did not need to be settled, as the
Justices were agreed that the defendants had induced infringement of copyright, and decided the
issue accordingly. See Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Did MGM Really Win the
Grokster Case?, http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/-pampapers/CACM%20SCT%20decides%
20MGM.pdf.
9 Id. For example, in a concurring judgment, Justice Ginsburg comments:

Even if the absolute number of noninfringing files copied using the Grokster
and StreamCast software is large, it does not follow that the products are
therefore put to substantial noninfringing uses and are thus immune from
liability. The number of noninfringing copies may be reflective of, and dwarfed
by, the huge total volume of files shared. Further, the District Court and the
Court of Appeals did not sharply distinguish between uses of Grokster's and
StreamCast's software products (which this case is about) and uses of
peer-to-peer technology generally (which this case is not about).
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 948 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). This opinion was further
supported in the Tenenbaum case, where the idea that downloading could be fair use
was firmly rejected. For an update, see Jaikumar Vijayan, Lawyer in Tenenbaum
Music
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anticircumvention technologies and digital rights management,
treating interference with these technologies illegal.' 0 As provided by
the WIPO treaties, the answer to the fundamental problem of how to
strike a proper balance between copyright owners and the public in a
digital environment appears to be to give more rights to copyright
owners. Practically speaking, the Treaties provide right-holders with
more tools for their use in restricting access to works that copyright
law says they "own."
This is our starting point when we talk about the WIPO Treaties:
they tell us that the best way to adapt copyright to a digital
environment is to increase the scope and power of the rights held by
copyright-owners. Given this overall approach, the WIPO
Performance and Phonograms Treaty then goes on to do something
quite unexpected. It creates a moral right for performers. Depending
on your point of view, you may see this either as a pleasant or an
unpleasant surprise. As a scholar of moral rights, for whom they
signify a more humane approach to the law, I will permit myself to
call it a pleasant surprise.
In doing so, the WPPT-to invoke Star Trek now, in addition to
the earlier Star Wars reference-boldly extends moral rights where
they have never gone before. What are the implications of creating a
moral right for performers in the context of the digital environment?
In particular, what is their purpose in the light of the overall
objectives of the WIPO Treaties, which I have briefly described
above?
The WPPT scheme for moral rights is innovative and important in
a number of ways.11 First and foremost, at a time when conceptual
discussion of copyright issues has become distressingly rare, it is
certainly worth noting that this new moral right represents a highly
12
significant innovation in the theory of the law.
In fact, the WPPT represents the first international progress on
moral rights since they were first adopted in the Berne Convention in
1928.13 The new rights signify a new status for performers. Copyright
10See, e.g., WCT art. 11, 12, & 14, and WPPT art. 18, 19, & 23.
1 WPPT, supra note 1, at art. 5.
12Note the points made by Professor Okediji about the lack of conceptual discussion in
relation to copyright. Ruth Okediji, Keynote Address at the Case Western Reserve Law,
Technology, and the Arts Symposium: The WIPO Copyright Treaties: 10 Years Later (Nov. 10,
2006) (Web cast available at http://law.case.edu/Lectures.aspx?lec-id= 128).
13 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, revised most recently by Paris Act relating to the Berne Convention, July 24,
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. Ricketson describes the process of their
adoption at the 1928 Rome revision conference, and subsequent improvements and amendments
at the Brussels Conference of 1948 and the Stockholm Conference of 1967. See SAM
RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
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law has traditionally understood performers to be engaged in the
dissemination of information or culture, rather than creating works of
art in their own right. Accordingly, their status has been distinctly
inferior to that of true authors-a situation that has historically been
reflected in lower levels of protection for performers' rights, usually
known as mere "neighboring" rights to copyright, and delayed
recognition for them at the international level.14
A moral right inaugurates a new status for performers by
recognizing that they may, in fact, be as deeply implicated in their
work as authors. Like authors, performers, too, may be vulnerable to
harm from the failure to acknowledge them as the creators of their
own performances, or to preserve the integrity of their interpretations.
Practically speaking, this reflects a cultural adaptation of copyright
law to the digital environment. Moral rights for performers suggest a
recognition of the growing cultural importance of performers and
their creative activities in our digital age.
A second point worth noting about this innovation in the WPPT is
the affirmation that it provides overall for moral rights in a digital
environment. The moral rights in the WPPT are specifically adapted
to digital age activities-for example, directly addressing the
possibility of having access to performances through sound files that
may be obtained via the Internet. 15 In many situations involving the
communication of performances through digital technology, a moral
rights dimension could now be involved.
From the general perspective of practical impact, this is a
controversial approach. In an environment where copyright controls
have become increasingly difficult to enforce, the approach taken by
the WPPT is to create further rights and further layers of rights,
specifically in the introduction of moral rights for performers.
This leads to a third interesting feature of the WIPO Treaties: the
moral rights of performers in the WPPT bring additional complexity
to the problem of "layers" of rights that we frequently encounter in
copyright, and which is pronounced in relation to performances.

8.93-8.101 (1987). The changes in 1967, in particular, were significant,
but they scaled back moral rights by tacitly allowing common-law protection to take the place of
statutory law. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL
RIGHTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGY (Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2010).
14 The leading international instrument on performers' rights before WPPT was the
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations 1961, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome
Convention].
15 See, e.g., WPPT, supra note 1, at art. 10 on the "making available ... by wire or
wireless means" of fixed performances.
WORKS: 1886-1986
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Layering of rights is a complex question when dealing with
performances because of the number of interests that may be involved
in creating, "fixing," and publicizing a performance. When dealing
with performances, we may be concerned with the interaction of a
performer, a composer, possibly a lyricist, a sound engineer, a
producer, the owner of the sound recording and, of course, the public
that ultimately receives, enjoys, and "uses" that recording. We are
talking about interests that may be shared and overlapping in some
instances, but in conflict at other times, leaving copyright law to
devise rules for resolving these conflicts effectively.
Having considered the presence of moral rights in the WPPT as a
significant innovation in international copyright law, I would like to
discuss three deeper questions. First, why does the WPPT develop the
idea of a moral right for performers? Secondly, in doing so, how
exactly has the WPPT chosen to frame the moral right of the
performer? And thirdly and finally, what are the conceptual and
practical implications of the WPPT provisions for copyright in the
digital age? The answers to these questions can lead us to a better
understanding of whether the WPPT has accomplished what it set out
to do in the scheme for the protection of performers' moral rights and,
if not, what the provisions actually do achieve.
Why does the WPPT develop the idea of a performer's moral right?
The moral rights are undoubtedly a product of European Union and
United States synergy at the WIPO discussions leading to the
Treaties, described in some detail by the other panelists. The
Europeans, having a strong tradition of protection for authors' moral
rights, would probably have seen a moral right for performers as the
logical extension of a well-established and largely useful doctrine.
The U.S. position is more complex and ambivalent. On the one
hand, there has been great resistance to moral rights at home, largely
because of the Hollywood film industry. On the other hand, there
appears to be an awareness on the part of industry that moral rights
offer an additional layer of protection for performances, and a
consideration or hope that they could thereby help the film and music
industries in their fight for copyright control in a digital environment.
The overall impact of the right is to create an additional layer of rights
in performances. The question then becomes, what does this mean in
practice?
Moral rights are set out in Article 5 of the WPPT. The article is
drafted to be exactly parallel to Article 6bis of the Berne Convention,
which sets out two fundamental moral rights for authors: a right of
attribution and a right of integrity. Turning to Article 5 of the WPPT,
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we see that the same two rights are protected in relation to
performers.
The WPPT provisions include one significant limitation: the
language of the treaty specifies that moral rights only apply to "aural"
performances, 1 6 so that performances used in audiovisual works, as
mentioned by Professor Dinwoodie, would be specifically excluded.17
Interestingly, though, within their application to aural performances,
the moral rights in the WPPT are quite broad, extending both to live
performances and to recorded, or "fixed," performances. Once again,
this feature of the WPPT is technologically responsive: we see the
emergence of an idea of relative freedom in relation to the orthodox
copyright precept of fixation in order to accommodate the realities of
the performer's art in the digital context.
If we go on to paragraph 2 of Article 5, this provision, like the
moral rights provisions in the Berne Convention, seems to maintain
some interesting flexibilities in relation to the statutory enactment of
moral rights. 18 In particular, the idea that common law protection, or
torts, may suffice as a substitute for statutory provisions on
performers' moral rights is derived directly from Article 6bis,
subsection 2 of the Berne Convention. 19

16 Article 5 states:

(1) Independently of a performer's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
those rights, the performer shall, as regards his live aural performances or
performances fixed in phonograms, have the right to claim to be identified as the
performer of his performances, except where omission is dictated by the manner of
the use of the performance, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation.
Dinwoodie, supra note 7.
18 WPPT Article 5(2) states:
17

The rights granted to a performer in accordance with paragraph (1) shall, after his
death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be
exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the
Contracting Party where protection is claimed. However, those Contracting Parties
whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Treaty,
does not providefor protection after the death of the performerof all rights set out in
the precedingparagraphmay provide that some of these rights will, after his death,
cease to be maintained.
(emphasis added).
19 Article 6bis (2) provides:
The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall,
after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and
shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the
country where protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at
the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the
protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding
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However, I should add that, as in the case of Berne, a careful
reading of this section suggests that some protection beyond tort law,
some kind of statutory enactment, however minimal, is required for
performers' moral rights. 20 But it is far from clear what the extent of
this obligation might be, originally in Berne and now, equally, in the
WPPT.
In terms of the practical implications of the new moral right for
performers, the benefit of introducing this moral right is to be found
in relation to the issue of balancing rights within copyright law, a
persistent theme of this panel. When I talk about balancing rights,
however, I am not only referring to the usual copyright balancing act,
that of weighing the public interest against that of copyright owners,
which was so powerfully addressed by Professor Vaver.2 1 I am
talking about a third element in this balancing act: the introduction of
the performer as a creative individual into the copyright equation.
And this is a surprising yet important achievement of the WPPT in an
environment where copyright is generally thought of, as emphasized
by Professor Dinwoodie, in terms of right-owner versus public. 22
The benefit of introducing a moral right for performers-or
indeed, introducing performers into the world of copyright-raises
some practical concerns. First, where moral rights are involved, we
have an additional level of rights in relation to which clearance will
have to be obtained by anyone who wants to use the work. In the case
of the WPPT, permissions or consent may have to be obtained from
the performer. This issue is complicated by the fact that moral rights
are generally inalienable, so that a "user" may have to obtain dual
permissions from both the copyright owner and the actual performer
of the work.
The consideration of inalienability leads to a second point: in
addition to introducing another layer of complexity in the use of
performances, moral rights may reveal the potential for antagonism
between the creator of a work and those involved in its exploitation.
Moral rights may not create this hostility, but they may give legal
expression to the divergent interests of creator and publisher for the

paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be
maintained.
20 Article 5(2) states that "some" rights may cease to be maintained after the author's
death; presumably, "some" therefore must be protected even after his or her death. Personal
torts cease to operate once an individual is deceased. See WPPT, supra note 1.
21 David Vaver, Copyright and the Internet: From Owner Rights and User Duties to User
Rights and Owner Duties? 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 751 (2007).
22 Dinwoodie, supra note 7.
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first time, shifting the balance of bargaining power between them.
Given the number of individual copyright claims that may be
implicated in a performance, this issue could be significant in
redefining a number of key relationships: performer and composer,
performer and sound engineer, performer and producer, performer
and record label. And, inevitably, our final consideration is the
relationship between performer and public, made more complex by
the articulation of moral rights.
The issue of balance is clearly a multidimensional problem, and, in
the wake of Professor Dinwoodie's discussion,23 we may want to take
a moment to look at it more closely. First, let us consider the balance
between performers, or creators of works, and those who exploit them
commercially: performer versus record label.
Given the drafting history of the WPPT-and in particular, the role
of the United States in establishing moral rights for performers-it is
particularly important to focus on the connection between moral
rights and the individual performer. We do not want to find ourselves
in a situation where moral rights may be co-opted by industry as one
more tool in its struggle for power. In other words, it should not
become a standard practice for industry to seek to assert moral rights
on behalf of performers.
This would be both inconsistent with the theory of the law and
dangerous from a practical point of view. Through moral rights,
corporations could acquire the power to restrict freedom of
expression. We may be able to justify giving the performer a say in
the treatment of his or her own work on humanitarian grounds; 24 what
justification can we offer for25 transferring the exercise of these
personal rights to corporations?
In terms of balancing the needs of performer and public, here
again, we have a fairly complex issue. The freedom of expression of
the public is at stake; so, too, is the freedom and independence of the
performer. We may be talking about a net benefit in the long term-a
more humane cultural environment for performers-but, as this
benefit is more obviously cultural than economic in nature, it may be
too difficult to recognize or too imprecise to commit ourselves. The
23 Dinwoodie, supra note 7.
24 For a detailed discussion of the human rights rationales for copyright and moral rights
protection, see M.T. SUNDARA RAAN, COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVE FREEDOM: A STUDY OF
POST-SOCIALIST LAW REFORM ch. IX (2006).

25 Japan appears to be unique in offering a moral right to corporations; but the provision
exists in a unique corporate environment. See Sundara Rajan, supra note 13; see also Copyright
Law of Japan, ch. 2, § 2, art. 15-16 ("Authors"), available at http://www.cric.or.jp/cric e/clj/
clj.html.

776

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:4

economic consequences of a moral right for performers, even more
than in the case of authors' moral rights, remain largely unknown.
All of these implications of the WPPT remain abstract until the
principles in the Treaty find their way into national legislation. The
challenge of drafting and interpreting these rights in domestic laws, as
I have already indicated and would like to repeat, is to achieve the
benefit of including performers in the copyright process. It would be
ideally satisfying to be able to acknowledge the creative contribution
of the performer as an individual, while developing a workable
relationship among the different interests involved in the process of
making a performance available to the public.
I would like to consider briefly the Canadian example of the
WPPT interpretation and implementation, from which I think
something can be learned-at the very least, to jump ahead to my
"punch line" about how not to do things. Canada presents an
interesting contrast to other common-law jurisdictions, including the
United States. Canadian lawyers like to think of their country as
having a slightly friendlier, more accommodating approach to moral
rights, made possible by their heritage of French law. This is a bit
doubtful in practice. For example, we have only had one successful
instance of moral rights litigation in the history of Canadian law !26
Nevertheless, Canadian provisions on moral rights offer some
advantages in comparison to other jurisdictions-such as the recently
enacted provisions in the U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of
1988 27-in the sense that they represent a relatively clear and
straightforward implementation of the attribution and integrity rights
in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. 28 But the Canadian
provisions on moral rights are subject to a major practical caveat,
namely, that the Copyright Act allows for extensive waivers. 29 In fact,
the Canadian Copyright Act seems to sanction so-called blanket
waivers of moral rights, which brings into question our overall
commitment to the protection of moral rights.3 °
In terms of implementing the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty provisions on moral rights, Canada has a bill with
proposed implementation terms. Bill C-60 31 was introduced by the
Snow v. Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R.2d 105 (Ont. H.C.J).
Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, ch. 48, ch. IV, §§ 77-89, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1988fUkpga-19880048_en_ .htm.
28 Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, §§ 14.1, 14.2, 28.1, 28.2.
29 Id. §§ 14.1(2)-(4).
30 Id. § 14.1(2). For the controversial provision on implicit waiver of rights where a third
party is concerned, see § 14.1(4).
31 Bill C-60, House of Commons of Canada, An Act to amend the Copyright Act ch. 27,
(June 20, 2005), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publiction.aspx?Docid=
26

27
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previous government and the approach is likely to be revived if the
government carries out its promised copyright reforms in 2010. Bill
C-60 sought to enact moral rights for performers in more or less the
same way as the Copyright Act does for authors, including the
extensive provisions on waiver. In the proposed Bill, moral rights for
performers, like those of authors and artists, could be waived in whole
or in part.32 This approach to moral rights is a mistake. It represents
an opportunity missed. In this respect, other countries should certainly
take note of what has happened in Canada.
The drafters of Canada's Bill C-60 simply followed the
pre-existing practices of the Canadian Copyright Act on moral rights
without thinking about the practical implications of doing so in
relation to performers. What the Bill has done is to implement the
language of the WPPT, without necessarily taking the rights seriously
and giving them true, practical effect. The WPPT offers an
opportunity to give some power to the performer in the process of
commercializing his or her work-at the very least, some bargaining
power when dealing with powerful industry practices. This happens
to be the opportunity offered by the WPPT provisions.
Giving practical effect to performers' moral rights would have
much larger implications for Canadian law-a fact that has probably
frightened the Canadian government in its approach to the
implementation process. If we treat performers' moral rights as true
rights, rather than merely formal ones, this inevitably leads to the
realization that we will also have to reconsider our approach to the
moral rights of authors in our copyright law. Otherwise, we would
find ourselves in the legally and practically incongruous situation
where performers might actually enjoy more rights than authors under
our Copyright Act.
In conclusion, I would like to suggest that, since we now have
moral rights for performers in the WPPT, and irrespective of how
they found their way into the Treaty, we should take them seriously.
In particular, the moral rights in the WPPT present an opportunity to
bring greater rationality to modem copyright practice. We should
seek to create rights that we intend to respect and enforce. We should
delineate the scope and limitations of those rights clearly, by ensuring
that our approach to them is informed by an understanding of the
2334015&file=4.
32 See Mira T. Sundara Rajan, The 'New Listener' and the Virtual Performer: The Need
for a New Approach to Performers' Rights, in Canadian Copyright Reform in the Digital Age
(M Geist ed., Irwin Law/Creative Commons) (2005), available at http://209.171.61.222/
PublicInterest/two_8_rajan.htm.
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theory of the law in which they are grounded. Moral rights are based
on the idea of a personal connection between author and work or, by
analogy in this case, performer and performance. Their purpose is to
protect this special relationship-not to give entertainment companies
an additional weapon to add to their arsenal of copyright enforcement
tools. At the same time, the rights represent a promise to creators, that
their attribution and integrity interests, to whatever extent is feasible
and fair, will be honored.
If we depart from these premises, what we are doing is to create
rights without a proper grounding in policy, and without any serious
possibility of enforcement. Yet these are precisely the ills which
currently afflict the world of culture-copyright laws that are
irrational, amenable to political and economic manipulation, and
operating in an environment where practical enforcement is a serious
problem. The letter of the law and its practical reality are divorced
from one another. The problem is truly global in scope: countries like
India, Russia, and China are becoming major players in the copyright
arena, but they pay lip service to legislation without being willing or
able to do what is necessary to give effect to international agreements,
as they are now harshly translated into their own copyright laws.33
Ultimately, these developments point to a degree of irrationality in
our approach to copyright. They have the power to undermine
copyright law more effectively than any anti-copyright movement
could, threatening both the practical effectiveness and the moral
credibility of copyright in the digital age.

33 The problems of copyright reform in the era of the WTO and the TRIPs Agreement are
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it should be noted that TRIPs-related reform has
clearly undermined the moral credibility of copyright law, and intellectual property rights more
generally, in large parts of the world. For an example, see the discussion in SUNDARA RAJAN,
supra note 32, ch. L

